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When Courts Determine Fees in a System 
With a Loser Pays Norm: Fee Award Denials  





Under the English rule, the loser pays litigation costs whereas under the American rule, 
each party pays its own costs.  Israel instead vests in its judges full discretion to assess 
fees and costs as the circumstances may require.  Both the English and the American 
rules have been the subjects of scholarly criticism.  Because little empirical information 
exists about how either rule functions in practice, an empirical study of judicial litigation 
cost award practices should be of general interest.  This Article presents such a study in 
the context of Israel’s legal system.  We report evidence that Israeli judges apply their 
discretion to implement multiple de facto litigation cost systems: a one-way shifting 
system that dominates in most tort cases; a loser pays system that operates when publicly 
owned corporations litigate; and a loser pays system with discretion to deny litigation 
costs in other cases.  Although a loser pays norm dominates in Israel with litigation costs 
awarded to the prevailing party in 80 percent of cases, Israeli judges still often exercised 
their discretion to protect certain losing litigants, especially individuals, from having to 
pay their adversaries’ litigation costs.  In tort cases won by individual plaintiffs against 
corporate defendants, for example, corporations had to pay their own litigation costs plus 
plaintiffs’ litigation costs 99 percent of the time.  Even when the corporate defendants 
prevailed, they still had to pay their own litigation costs 52 percent of the time.  When 
public corporations litigated and lost, a loser pays system dominated.  Award patterns 
also varied by case category and judicial district.  In property cases in one district, courts 
denied prevailing plaintiffs fees in about 75 percent of cases.  Theorizing about optimal 
fee rules should account for the variety of fee outcomes observed in practice.
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All legal systems encounter the fundamental issues of how to compensate 
litigating attorneys and how to allocate other litigation expenses.  Such compen-
sation and expenses have received much recent scholarly attention.1  They have 
even reached Europe’s highest courts, where litigants have prevailed on claims 
that high court costs or the denial of legal aid violated fundamental rights under 
European law.2  Litigation fees and expenses even provide a basis on which 
countries compete for legal business.3 
Commonly, discussions about litigation costs (fees plus costs)4 proceed as if 
only two approaches existed to allocating these costs among litigating parties.  
These two approaches are usually labeled the English rule and the American rule.5  
In the state of Alaska and in most Western legal systems other than the United 
States, the prevailing norm is the English rule, under which the losing party is 
required to pay the reasonable litigation costs incurred by the winning party.6  The 
  
1. See, e.g., Mathias Reimann, Cost and Fee Allocation in Civil Procedure: A Synthesis, in COST AND FEE 
ALLOCATION IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 3, 5–6 (Mathias Reimann ed., 2012); Issachar Rosen-Zvi, 
Just Fee Shifting, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 717, 731–34 (2010). 
2. See Reimann, supra note 1, at 6–7. 
3. For example, the German federal minister of justice competes for legal business by invoking the 
predictability of Germany’s litigation cost system: “As court and lawyer’s fees are prescribed by law 
and are always based on the value of the matter in dispute, legal costs can be calculated from the 
outset.”  SABINE LEUTHEUSSER-SCHNARRENBERGER, LAW—MADE IN GERMANY 29 (2012), 
available at http://www.lawmadeingermany.de/Law-Made_in_Germany.pdf. 
4. Although terminology can vary in the literature, this Article uses fees to refer to compensation paid 
to litigating attorneys and costs to refer to filing fees and the like.  In our analysis, we are usually 
interested in the collective of fees plus costs, which we refer to as litigation costs.  Practices with 
respect to fees and costs are not always consistent within a country.  See Reimann, supra note 1. 
5. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The English Versus the American Rule on Attorney 
Fees: An Empirical Study of Public Company Contracts, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 327, 328–29 (2013). 
6. See Werner Pfennigstorf, The European Experience With Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1984, at 37, 44–47; Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Shift Happens: Pressure on 
Foreign Attorney-Fee Paradigms From Class Actions, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 125, 128 (2003).  
For Alaska’s rule on fees, see ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82, which requires the losing party to pay a 
percentage of the prevailing party’s fees.  A loser pays provision is also found in section 5-111(e) of 
the Uniform Commercial Code, pertaining to violations of obligations by issuers of letters of credit.  
U.C.C. § 5-111(e) (2011).  Nevada allows an award of fees to a prevailing party when the prevailing 
party has not recovered more than $20,000.  NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18.010(2)(a) (2008). 
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American rule, on the other hand, ordinarily requires each party to bear its own 
litigation costs regardless of the outcome of the case.7 
Both systematic study of countries’ litigation cost practices and empirical 
study of how private parties contract about litigation costs suggest the inadequacy 
of the English rule–American rule dichotomy.  Mathias Reimann, for example, 
in summarizing a multicountry study of litigation cost practices, concluded that 
“[p]erhaps the most fundamental finding of this study is that such a dichotomy is 
hopelessly simplistic as well as virtually useless.”8  Even within the United States, 
a study of litigation cost clauses in contracts revealed that many such clauses do 
not fall neatly under either rule.9 
Several practices blur the lines between methods of allocating litigation costs.  
In many systems that nominally follow a loser pays principle, for example, the 
losing party is only required to pay a statutorily or otherwise specified amount—
regardless of the prevailing party’s actual legal expenses—or only a percentage of 
the litigation costs.10  England often shifts litigation costs less than countries with 
such specified amounts or percentages.11  It and other British Commonwealth 
countries regard a loser pays principle as “a general guideline, basic expectation, 
and usual practice outcome.”12  But these countries grant some discretion to their 
  
7. See, e.g., Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 245–47 (1975).  An exception 
exists for vexatious litigation or litigation brought in bad faith, in which case the innocent party can 
recover litigation costs from the party acting in bad faith.  See, e.g., Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 
32, 45–46 (1991). 
8. Reimann, supra note 1, at 9. 
9. See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 5, at 352 tbl.2.  Some such contract clauses are even statutorily 
validated in a number of American states, including, for example, by a California statute requiring a 
party to pay its adversary’s fees if the party loses in litigation under a contract that specifies that the 
party is to receive fees from its adversary if it prevails.  See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1717(a) (West 2009) 
(“In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney’s fees and costs, 
which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the 
prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be the party prevailing on the contract, whether 
he or she is the party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees in 
addition to other costs.”).  Washington and Oregon have statutes similar to California’s.  See OR. 
REV. STAT. § 20.096 (2011) (stating that if a contract provides for fees to one party, the prevailing 
party is entitled to fees); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.84.330 (West 2006 & Supp. 2012) (stating 
the same).  New York has a statute to similar effect, but it is limited to landlord-tenant relations.  See 
N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 234 (McKinney 2006) (requiring a landlord to pay a tenant’s attorney’s 
fees if a lease of residential property requires the tenant to pay the landlord’s attorney’s fees). 
10. See Reimann, supra note 1, at 11 (reporting that a fixed cost schedule applies in Austria, Belgium, the 
Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Serbia, Turkey, and Switzerland, 
and that a percentage limitation applies in Brazil, Mexico, Spain, and Venezuela). 
11. See id. at 13. 
12. Id. 
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courts in allocating litigation costs, and judges often exercise their discretion to 
require a prevailing party to “bear a considerable share of its own costs.”13 
A plausible additional approach to allocating litigation costs is to vest full 
responsibility for assessing them in the institutional actor with case-specific 
expertise, with no affiliation with the litigating sides, and with a presumed 
interest in promoting justice as each individual case requires—the judge.  Such a 
judge-centered system could, in theory, effectively address the problems as-
sociated with the litigation cost allocation methods already described.  It might, 
for example, avoid the systematic underpayment of litigation costs in countries 
with fixed-amount or percentage-based reimbursement schedules since the judge 
can adjust the amount awarded as each case warrants.  A judge-centered system 
might also avoid the harshness of litigating parties with reasonable but losing 
claims having to bear the full litigation costs of their opponents.  Israel and South 
Africa have implemented such judge-centered allocation systems.14 
Regardless of the strengths and weakness of a judge-based system, it is an 
obvious candidate as an alternative to loser pays and neither party pays rules.  
Interest in how a judge-centered system actually functions should transcend the 
countries using it.  Its functioning should interest countries concerned about 
litigation costs and how they might be reduced, made more certain or more 
flexible, or made fairer.  Since litigation costs are a near-universal concern,15 this 
Article’s empirical study of Israel’s experience with a judge-centered system 
should therefore be of broad interest.   
Litigation costs is such a vast topic that one article can only focus on a few 
discrete questions.  This Article reports our findings about when judges do not 
impose litigation costs on a losing party—that is, when they deny an award to the 
prevailing party—despite having the discretion to grant an award.  The question 
of when to relieve a losing party from having to pay its adversary’s litigation costs 
is central to fee-shifting debates, which are usually framed in terms of a com-
petition between only the English and American rules.  In the United States, for 
example, some have argued for a change towards the English rule on the theory 
  
13. Id. 
14. See Talia Fisher & Issi Rosen-Zvi, It’s for the Judges to Decide: Allocation of Trial Costs in Israel Report 
on Israel, in COST AND FEE ALLOCATION IN CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 1, at 177, 177–78; 
Reimann, supra note 1, at 13.  With respect to South Africa, see Ferreira v. Levin 1996 (2) SA 621 
(CC) at 624 para. 3 (S. Afr.), which states that “the award of costs, unless expressly otherwise 
enacted, is in the discretion of the presiding judicial officer and . . . the successful party should, as a 
general rule, have his or her costs.” 
15. See Reimann, supra note 1. 
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that it more effectively deters the filing of frivolous lawsuits.16  Others, however, 
fear that the English rule exacerbates the already significant financial barriers that 
low- and middle-class individuals face in accessing the legal system.17 
To summarize our findings, Israeli judges exercise their discretion in a 
manner that often protects losing litigants, especially individuals.  Overall, Israeli 
judges denied litigation costs to prevailing defendants in 26.3 percent of cases 
and to prevailing plaintiffs in 16.3 percent of cases.  For individual plaintiffs and 
defendants, denial rates exceeded one-third for defendants who prevailed against 
individuals and exceeded one-quarter for plaintiffs who prevailed against in-
dividuals.  Denials of litigation costs operated to protect individual plaintiffs ag-
ainst awards more than corporations.  In cases lost by individual plaintiffs, 
litigation costs were denied to successful defendants 29.9 percent of the time 
compared to denials in 18.0 percent of cases lost by corporate plaintiffs and 16.7 
percent of cases lost by governmental plaintiffs.  In cases lost by individual 
defendants, litigation costs were denied to successful plaintiffs 22.7 percent of the 
time compared to 9.8 percent denials in cases lost by corporate defendants and 
21.2 percent denials in cases lost by government defendants.  Protection of 
individuals was especially prevalent in tort cases between individual plaintiffs and 
corporate defendants.  In cases brought by individual plaintiffs, corporations had 
to pay their own litigation costs plus plaintiffs’ 99 percent of the time.  In such 
cases won by the corporate defendants, they had to pay their own litigation costs 
52 percent of the time.  These general patterns, however, oversimplify a complex 
litigation cost allocation system that varied by prevailing party (plaintiff vs. 
defendant), party status (individual, government, corporation), case category (for 
example, tort, property, or contract), and judicial district.  Our findings suggest 
that Israeli judges operate multiple de facto litigation cost systems: a one-way 
shifting system that dominates in most tort cases; a loser pays system that 
  
16. See, e.g., CONTRACT WITH AMERICA: THE BOLD PLAN BY REP. NEWT GINGRICH, REP. 
DICK ARMEY AND THE HOUSE REPUBLICANS TO CHANGE THE NATION 143, 145–46 (Ed 
Gillespie & Bob Schellhas eds., 1994) (claiming that the house Republicans’ reform bill “penalizes 
frivolous lawsuits by making the loser pick up the winner’s legal fees”); PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON 
COMPETITIVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM IN AMERICA (1991), reprinted in 60 
U. CIN. L. REV. 979, 993–94, 1002–03 (1992) (proposing to revise the federal offer-of-judgment rule 
to include the “additional costs of trial,” presumably including attorney’s fees, and recommending a 
loser pays rule for discovery motions and for federal court diversity cases but calling for a moratorium 
on one-way, plaintiff-favoring fee-shifting statutes); Op-Ed., Loser Pays, Everyone Wins, WALL ST. J., 
Dec. 15, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703514904575602762974652860.html.  
For a proposal to implement some form of a loser pays rule, see, for example, Attorney 
Accountability Act of 1995, H.R. 988, 104th Cong. § 2, proposing that a nonprevailing party must 
pay the prevailing party’s attorney’s fees in federal civil diversity litigation in which an offer of 
settlement has been made. 
17. See, e.g., Rosen-Zvi, supra note 1, at 721–22. 
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operates when publicly-owned corporations litigate; and a loser pays system with 
discretion to deny litigation costs in all other cases.  In one judicial district, 
Nazareth, a system that requires each party to pay its own litigation costs prevailed 
in most property cases. 
It is important to track which party prevailed in trial court rulings because 
rates of litigation cost denials are highly associated with whether plaintiffs or 
defendants win.  Tracking the prevailing party also allows us to present the first 
major empirical summary of who prevails in litigation pursued to conclusion on 
the merits in Israel’s district courts. 
Part I of this Article briefly reviews relevant prior literature on litigation cost 
allocation rules and also reports our expectations about what results should obtain 
in Israel’s system.  Part II provides necessary background information about 
Israel’s legal system and its rules governing litigation costs.  Part III describes our 
study’s data and our research methodology.  Part IV reports our results, which are 
discussed in Part V.  We then offer concluding thoughts. 
I. PRIOR LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES 
Although a vast theoretical literature exists on litigation costs, much of it 
need not be described here.  The literature has been reviewed elsewhere and is of 
limited relevance to this study because it reaches few consistent predictions or 
prescriptions.18  Little, if any, prior literature focuses on outright denials of lit-
igation costs—the topic of our inquiry.  And no empirical literature exists on the 
pattern of litigation cost denials in the mass of cases in a court of first instance.  
Existing studies tend to examine litigation cost award amounts, not denials, in 
specific subsets of cases—such as class action settlements19 or automobile ac-
cident cases.20  Class action litigation cost awards in the United States are 
somewhat analogous to Israel’s allocation system in that the amounts of fee 
awards to class counsel are left almost completely to the discretion of the district 
judge.21  This judge-based corner of American class action law has produced a 
  
18. See, e.g., Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 5. 
19. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees and Expenses in Class Action Settlements: 
1993–2008, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 248 (2010) [hereinafter Eisenberg & Miller (2010)]; 
Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees in Class Action Settlements: An Empirical 
Study, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 27 (2004) [hereinafter Eisenberg & Miller (2004)]. 
20. See Paul Fenn & Neil Rickman, Fixing Lawyers’ Fees Ex Ante: A Case Study in Policy and Empirical 
Legal Studies, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 533, 539 (2011). 
21. See, e.g., Eisenberg & Miller (2010), supra note 19, at 249 (arguing that the judge is the only actor 
who can protect the class’s interest in setting the fee). 
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highly regular pattern of fee awards, in which the level of the award is largely 
determined by the amount of the class recovery.22 
Some literature reviewing actual litigation cost award practice provides 
guidance about what judicial behavior to expect in Israel’s judge-centered system.  
As noted above, Reimann’s review of dozens of legal systems found that many of 
those systems were reluctant to apply loser pays rules fully.23  The perceived neg-
ative effect on potential low-income litigants seems to motivate the sentiment 
against full shifting of litigation costs.24  Some theoretical law and economics anal-
ysis also suggests that limited litigation cost shifting, rather than full and unlimit-
ed reimbursement under a loser pays rule, may provide a superior litigation cost 
allocation system.25 
In response to such concerns about a firm loser pays rule, most English rule 
jurisdictions temper their rule.  In Australia it is estimated that despite a loser 
pays rule, prevailing parties do not recover 40 to 50 percent of their litigation 
costs;26 Belgium has a fixed reimbursement schedule but the amounts awarded to 
prevailing parties are regarded as small;27 and Brazil has a low percentage cap on 
recoverable litigation costs28 and exempts people who cannot afford the costs of 
litigation from the loser pays rule altogether.29  Even Germany, the core jur-
isdiction that Reimann categorizes as a “major shifting” jurisdiction,30 limits 
recovery of litigation costs to a statutorily prescribed amount.31  A winning party 
that agreed to pay its attorney higher fees than specified in the statute cannot 
  
22. See id. at 253–54 (showing a strong linear correlation between fee amount and class recovery 
amount). 
23. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
24. A strict loser pays rule has been described, for example, as “a crude exclusion device the burden of 
which falls disproportionately on individuals and community groups which do not have the same 
deep pockets as governments and corporations.”  Camille Cameron, The Price of Access to the Civil 
Courts in Australia—Old Problems, New Solutions: A Commercial Litigation Funding Study, in COST 
AND FEE ALLOCATION IN CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 1, at 59, 60 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
25. See Emanuela Carbonara & Francesco Parisi, Rent-Seeking and Litigation: The Hidden Virtues of the 
Loser-Pays Rule 3 (Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 12-39, 2012), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2144800. 
26. Cameron, supra note 24, at 60. 
27. See Ilse Samoy & Vincent Sagaert, “Everything Costs Its Own Cost, and One of Our Best Virtues Is a Just 
Desire to Pay It.” An Analysis of Belgian Law, in COST AND FEE ALLOCATION IN CIVIL 
PROCEDURE, supra note 1, at 79, 83.  For a fixed fee schedule in United Kingdom automobile 
accident cases, see Fenn & Rickman, supra note 20, at 555. 
28. See Alexandre Alcino de Barros & Sílvia Julio Bueno de Miranda, Major Shifting: The Brazilian Way, 
in COST AND FEE ALLOCATION IN CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 1, at 89, 92. 
29. See id. at 94. 
30. Reimann, supra note 1, at 10. 
31. See Burkhard Hess & Rudolf Huebner, Cost and Fee Allocation in German Civil Procedure, in COST 
AND FEE ALLOCATION IN CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 1, at 151, 151. 
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recover the excess from the losing party.32  The justification offered for this 
limited recoverability is that it reduces “the financial risk of civil litigation and 
thus protects the losing party.”33  Many other countries described in Riemann’s 
volume on litigation cost allocation systems similarly limit the loser pays rule.34 
Dissatisfaction with the default American rule in the United States has led 
to many statutory mandates to shift litigation costs in certain types of cases.35  But 
these statutes are often applied in such a way that litigation cost shifting occurs 
only in favor of prevailing plaintiffs.  For example, in 1980, Florida enacted a stat-
ute regulating medical malpractice litigation under which a losing party had to 
pay the prevailing party’s litigation costs.36  The state’s medical association sup-
ported the statute based on the belief that litigation cost shifting would 
discourage the pursuit of weak claims.37  The law, however, contained a provision 
relieving insolvent parties of having to pay the prevailing party’s litigation costs, 
leading some practitioners to view the rule as evolving into one-way shifting 
scheme favoring plaintiffs.38  The Florida legislature repealed the statute five 
years later, at the behest of the medical association that initially had sought its 
passage.39 
Evolution to one-way shifting also occurred under the main U.S. federal 
fee-shifting statute applicable to civil rights cases, enacted as part of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1976.40  The statute authorizes a litigation cost award to the 
“prevailing party” in civil rights cases and thus does not expressly distinguish 
between plaintiffs and defendants.41  In practice, however, it is difficult for 




34. See COST AND FEE ALLOCATION IN CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 1. 
35. See, e.g., Rozen-Zvi, supra note 1, at 721. 
36. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.56 (repealed 1985). 
37. See Edward A. Snyder & James W. Hughes, The English Rule for Allocating Legal Costs: Evidence 
Confronts Theory, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 345, 355–56 (1990).  The new statute notwithstanding, 
however, the number of filed claims appeared to increase after passage of the shifting rule.  Id. at 356. 
38. See id. 
39. See id. at 345, 355–56. 
40. Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2006)). 
41. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (“[T]he court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the 
United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs . . . .”).  In 1991, Congress amended the 
statute to permit the court, in its discretion, to allow expert fees as part of the attorney’s fee.  See Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 113(a)(2), 105 Stat. 1071, 1079 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. § 1988(c)). 
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a one-way shifting statute under which plaintiffs recover their litigation costs if 
they prevail but need not pay the litigation costs of their adversaries if they lose.42 
So although loser pays countries and the United States differ in their default 
rules, most of either side’s forays into litigation cost shifting reflect a similar 
sentiment: Full recovery is often regarded as unjust and as imposing too great a 
risk of stifling justified litigation by persons of limited means.  Consequently, 
rules or judicial discretion often temper the negative effects of a pure loser pays 
system. 
If Israeli judges share the sentiments reflected in international practice, we 
can expect them to use their discretion in allocating litigation costs to implement 
differential treatment based on the losing party’s perceived ability to pay.  
Although our data lack detailed financial information about individual litigants, 
they do include litigants’ status as individuals, corporations, public corporations, 
or governmental entities.  We use this status as a proxy for ability to pay.  We as-
sume that, on average, corporations have a greater ability to pay than individuals 
do and that public corporations have a greater ability to pay than other corpo-
rations do.  We therefore expect the Israeli pattern of litigation cost awards to 
protect individuals and nonpublic corporations over public corporations.  The 
government clearly has greater ability to pay than almost all other litigants do.  
But it also differs from other litigants in its financial incentives and in its litigation 
behavior.43  Therefore, we do not have a clear expectation about how judges will 
treat the government in allocating litigation costs. 
II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION ABOUT ISRAEL’S LEGAL SYSTEM 
Comprehending this study requires some understanding of Israel’s relevant 
institutional framework.  Our focus in this Article is on litigation costs at the trial 
court level in Israel’s district courts, and thus we limit the institutional description 
of Israel’s court system in Part II.A to those aspects most relevant to this study.  
In Part II.B, we then describe Israel’s rules on the allocation of litigation costs. 
  
42. Cf. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, 434 U.S. 412, 416–17, 421 
(1978) (quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968)) (stating that only 
an unreasonable, frivolous, or groundless claim will support a fee award to a prevailing defendant in 
Title VII cases and that a prevailing plaintiff will receive a fee award unless there are “special 
circumstances [which] would render such an award unjust” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
43. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Henry Farber, The Government as Litigant: Further Tests of the Case 
Selection Model, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 94, 95 (2003). 
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A. Israel’s Trial Court System44 
Israel is a unitary state with a single system of courts of general jurisdic-
tion.  Other authorities also exercise subject matter or person-specific juris-
diction.  Among the courts of general jurisdiction, Israel’s judiciary law establishes 
a hierarchy of three levels with the Israel Supreme Court (ISC) at the top, district 
courts below it, and magistrates’ courts at the bottom.45  District courts and 
magistrates’ courts function as trial courts, while the Supreme Court functions 
both as an appellate court and as High Court of Justice (HCJ).46  In its HCJ 
capacity, the ISC operates as a court of first and last instance, primarily in areas 
relating to government behavior.47 
Twenty-nine magistrates’ courts operate as Israel’s basic trial courts and 
serve the locality and district in which they sit.  They have civil jurisdiction over 
matters involving up to a specified monetary amount—currently 2.5 million 
shekels (NIS) (approximately U.S. $675,000)—as well as over the use, pos-
session, and division of real property.  Magistrates’ courts also serve as traffic 
courts, municipal courts, family courts, and small claims courts.  Generally, a 
single judge presides over each case unless the president of a specific magistrates’ 
court directs that a panel of three judges should hear a particular case.48 
District courts have residual jurisdiction over matters not within the sole 
jurisdiction of another court.49  There are six district courts, which sit in 
Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Haifa, Beer Sheva, Nazareth, and Petah-Tikva.  The Petah-
Tikva court was established in 2007.50  District courts have civil jurisdiction over 
matters in which more than 2.5 million NIS are in dispute and commonly 
adjudicate cases involving companies and partnerships, arbitration, and 
prisoner petitions.  They also hear appeals on tax matters and serve as adminis-
trative law courts.  District courts also hear appeals from judgments of the mag-
istrates’ courts.51  Generally, a single district court judge presides over trial.  A 
panel of three judges, however, hears appeals from magistrates’ court judgments 
  
44. Unless noted otherwise, this description of the Israeli judiciary is based on a similar description in 
Theodore Eisenberg et al., Does the Judge Matter? Exploiting Random Assignment on a Court of Last 
Resort to Assess Judge and Case Selection Effects, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 246, 252–54 (2012). 
45. See generally Courts Law (Consolidated Version), 5744-1984, 38 LSI 271 (1983–1984) (Isr.). 
46. See Menachem Hofnung & Keren Weinshall Margel, Judicial Setbacks, Material Gains: Terror 
Litigation at the Israeli High Court of Justice, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 664, 669 (2010). 
47. See id. 
48. See Courts Law (Consolidated Version), 5744-1984, 38 LSI 271 (1983–1984) ch. 2, art. 3, § 47 (Isr.). 
49. See id. ch. 2, art. 2, § 40(2). 
50. Ordinances of Courts (Establishment of the Central District Court), 2007, KT 6585, 824. 
51. See Courts Law (Consolidated Version), 5744-1984, 38 LSI 271 (1983–1984) ch. 2, art. 2, § 
40(3) (Isr.). 
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and sits when the president or deputy resident of a district court so directs.52  Our 
data do not include any cases with a three-judge panel.  This study is limited to 
cases originating in the district courts. 
Civil case filing fees are infrequently discussed as a significant part of 
litigation costs in the United States because they tend to be relatively small.53  In 
Israel, however, filing fees are much more substantial and, because they impose 
higher ex ante costs, likely exert greater influence over the nature of cases filed in 
court.  Filing fees in the general civil courts for monetary claims are 2.5 percent of 
the value of the relief sought, including a minimum fee that currently stands at 
744 NIS.  Any claim over 23,800,859 NIS (about $5.2 million), results in a filing 
fee reduced to 1 percent of the claim amount.54  Thus, filing fees in monetary 
damages cases can be several thousand dollars.  Filing fees in cases involving 
nonmonetary relief—such as suits for declaratory relief, contempt of court, or 
derivative suits—as well as in personal injury suits are fixed by the Court Rules 
(Court Fees) of 2007 and are updated from time to time.55  Several exceptions to 
the requirement to pay filing fees exist depending either on a litigant’s financial 
hardship or on the nature of the claim filed.  For example, courts will exempt 
plaintiffs in full or in part on a showing of financial inability to pay the fee.56  This 
exemption applies narrowly, however, and an applicant for relief must 
demonstrate not only inadequate personal financial resources but also the 
unavailability of access to financial assistance from other sources (such as family 
members).57  Exemptions from, or reductions of, filing fees based on the nature of 
the claim filed include such cases as prisoner petitions and governmental takings, 
as well as many others.58 
  
52. See id. ch. 2, art. 2. 
53. For example, the filing fee to commence a civil action in federal court is $350.  See 28 U.S.C. § 
1914(a) (2006).  For a list of state court filing fees, see NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, CIVIL 
FILING FEES IN STATE TRIAL COURTS, APRIL, 2012 (2012), available at http://www.ncsc.org/ 
information-and-resources/budget-resource-center/~/media/Files/PDF/Information%20and%20 
Resources/Budget%20Resource%20Center/Civil%20Filing%20Fees%20April%202012.ashx. 
54. Second Supplement of the Court Rules (Court Fees), 2007, sec. 8 (on file with author). 
55. See id. sec. 2 (stating that the filing fee for bodily injury cases filed in magistrates’ court is currently 
6592 NIS (about $1,780)); id. sec. 9 (stating that the filing fee for bodily injury cases filed in district 
court is currently 41,203 NIS (about $11,125)); id. sec. 3 (stating that the filing fee for declaratory 
relief cases filed in magistrates’ court is currently 633 NIS (about $171)); id. sec. 10 (stating that the 
filing fee for declaratory relief cases filed in district court is currently 1115 NIS (about $301)).  
Specialized courts and tribunals—such as family courts, labor courts, small claims courts, and the 
like—are governed by special rules with respect to filing fees. 
56. See id. sec. 14. 
57. See SA 494/95 Shimoni v. Shimoni (unpublished, Mar. 23, 1995); TA (Tel Aviv) 511/98 Fuks v. 
Discount Bank LTD (unpublished, June 9, 1999). 
58. See Second Supplement of the Court Rules secs. 3, 9, 20. 
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B. Israel’s Law on Litigation Costs 
Israeli law governing litigation costs differs from almost all other legal 
systems in the world (except South Africa and, to some extent, India)59 in that the 
court has almost complete discretion over allocation decisions.  The rules 
regulating court costs and attorney’s fees (which are treated jointly)60 are specified 
in the Rules of Civil Procedure from 1984 (RCP).61  The fundamental litigation 
cost allocation rule—Rule 511—grants courts wide discretion with regards to 
both the allocation of litigation costs and the amount awarded, and subjects this 
discretion to only a limited set of guidelines prescribed in Rule 512.62 
The RCP instruct courts to base their litigation cost rulings on, among other 
things, the amount or value of the relief asked for by the plaintiff and the remedy 
granted by the court.  They also authorize the courts to take into consideration the 
behavior of the parties during trial.  Although, in practice, judges usually follow 
the “loser pays rule,”63 the law does not mandate this and judges can—and 
sometimes do—order winning parties to pay losing parties’ litigation costs.64  In 
terms of the amounts awarded, some transformation has taken place over time.  
Historically, courts tended to completely disregard the actual amounts expended 
by winning parties, leading, in all likelihood, to undercompensation.65  In recent 
years, however, following the “constitutional revolution,”66 which constitution-
alized to a certain extent civil procedure, both those within and without the 
  
59. See Reimann, supra note 1, at 1. 
60. Although the Rules of Civil Procedure treat court costs and attorney’s fees jointly using the term 
“expenses,” the Israeli Supreme Court (ISC) has urged judges to rule separately on court costs and 
attorney’s fees, not the least because one must add a value-added tax (VAT) to attorney’s fees, which 
should not be included in the amount payable as court costs.  See CA 9535/04 Siat “Biyalik 10” v. 
Siat “Yesh Atid Biyalik,” 60(1) PD 391 [2005] (Isr.).  It should be noted, however, that not all judges 
follow the ISC’s recommendation. This Article’s outcome variable of primary interest is whether 
litigation costs were denied.  In such cases, the prevailing party received neither costs nor fees. 
61. Rules of Civil Procedure, 1984, K.T. 5685, 2288 (Isr.). 
62. Id. 
63. URI GOREN, ISSUES IN CIVIL PROCEDURE (10th ed. 2009).  
64. See, e.g., CA (Jer) 35178-09-12 Morgenstern v. Drinking Bottles Collection Corp. (unpublished, 
Feb. 11, 2013). 
65. This is our impression of the prevalent supposition in the legal community. 
66. See Yoram Rabin & Yuval Shany, The Israeli Unfinished Constitutional Revolution: Has the Time Come 
for Protecting Economic and Social Rights?, 37 ISR. L. REV. 299, 310 (2003–2004) (“The enactment of 
the 1992 basic laws [Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and Basic Law: Freedom of 
Occupation] underlies the claim that Israeli has undergone a ‘constitutional revolution,’ transforming 
it from a parliament-supremacy type democracy (similar to the UK) to a constitutional democracy 
(like most other Western democracies) where human rights serve as powerful ‘trumps.’”). 
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judicial system have increasingly argued that litigation costs awarded to winning 
parties should be more in line with their actual litigation costs.67 
In 2005, the ISC’s Registrar68 delivered a decision instructing judges to 
award winning parties their actual litigation costs unless such an award would 
unreasonably impair access to justice and equality or cause overdeterrence.69  In a 
subsequent decision, the ISC explained that the intent of awarding the winning 
party its actual litigation costs is to prevent financial loss by the winning party, to 
deter potential plaintiffs from filing frivolous claims, and to discourage potential 
defendants from defending against a rightful suit.70  The ISC, however, con-
tinued that this preference for awarding actual litigation costs is subject to the 
incurred costs being “reasonable, proportional and necessary for the litigation.”71  
This limitation is intended to avoid overdeterrence, to prevent inequality between 
rich and poor parties, to inhibit inappropriate increases in the cost of litigation, 
and to foster access to justice.72 
Another recent ISC decision specified some of the factors judges should 
consider when awarding litigation costs: the character of the suit and its com-
plexity, the sought-after relief and the proportionality between it and the relief 
actually granted, the amount of work invested by the award recipient on the liti-
gation, the actual amount paid or payable as attorney’s fees, and the behavior of 
the requesting party during the litigation.73 
Notwithstanding these decisions, it is clear to those acquainted with Israeli 
civil litigation that, in the majority of the cases, the awarded litigation costs do not 
reflect the actual costs expended during the litigation.  This is in part because 
courts do not know what the parties’ actual litigation costs were.  Parties re-
questing an award of litigation costs are not required to, and rarely do, introduce 
into evidence the actual costs and fees they had to expend on the litigation.74 
  
67. SHLOMO LEVIN, THE THEORY OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: INTRODUCTION AND BASIC 
PRINCIPLES (2008). 
68. The ISC Registrar is a magistrate court judge who sits at the ISC and handles certain procedural 
issues, such as requests for filing fees exemptions, petitions to join parties, and questions of appellate 
jurisdiction. 
69. See HC 891/05 Tnuva v. The Authority for the Licensing of Imports (unpublished, June 30, 2005). 
70. See RCA 6793/08 Luar v. Meshulam Levinshtein Handasa Vekablanut (unpublished, June 28, 2009). 
71. Id. 
72. See id. 
73. See CA 9535/04 Siat “Biyalik 10” v. Siat “Yesh Atid Biyalik,” 60(1) P.D. 391 [2005] (Isr.). 
74. In 2002, the ISC’s president, Justice Aharon Barak, issued administrative guidance regarding the 
award of attorney’s fees.  According to the guidance, judges, when calculating attorney’s fees, are 
allowed to take into account the written retainer agreement between the party and her attorney that 
was introduced into evidence by the attorney during trial or as an annex to the written summations.  
The second part of the guidance qualifies this instruction by stating that attorneys are not obligated 
to introduce retainer agreements into evidence and that courts are not obligated to take them into 
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In summary, the RCP and other guidance provided to Israeli judges em-
body considerations similar to those in theoretical discussions of optimal liti-
gation cost allocation rules.  Avoiding financial loss to prevailing parties, deterring 
frivolous litigation, promoting defendant reasonableness, promoting fair access 
to the justice system, avoiding overdeterrence, and making awards correspond to 
effort expended all appear in such theoretical discussions as well.75  To the extent 
that Israeli judges strive to accommodate these multiple considerations, their 
behavior supplies evidence of how a more finely tuned litigation cost allocation 
system might function.   
III. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
A. Data and Methodology 
We use an original data set gathered for this study.  The data consist of civil 
cases filed under the original jurisdiction of the five district courts that existed in 
Israel in 2005 and 2006.  Because our topic is the award of litigation costs, we 
included only civil cases that reached final decisions on the merits.  The study in-
cludes every case decided in 2005 or 2006 for which an opinion was available 
online via the Dinim website.76  Dinim is a private company that furnishes at-
torneys and other paying clients with access to case information.  Using the 
Dinim database led us to focus our inquiry on 2005 and 2006 in the first instance 
because these are the first two years for which the database is supposedly compre-
hensive regarding district court decisions.77  Prior to those years, we could not be 
sure that the selection of cases by the people who operate Dinim did not generate 
selection bias.  Under Israeli law prevailing in the study years, parties in civil pro-
  
account when calculating.  See SUP. CT. ISR., ADMINISTRATIVE GUIDANCE OF THE PRESIDENT 
OF THE SUPREME COURT 1/98, CALCULATING ATTORNEY FEES (2002).  Justice Barak’s 
successor, President Justice Dorit Beynish, issued in 2010 an amendment to the administrative 
guidance proclaiming that, “as a general rule, the attorney fees to be awarded should approximate 
the actual costs expended on the litigation, subject to their being reasonable, proportional and 
necessary under the circumstances.  In this regard, each party is allowed to introduce . . . the written 
retainer agreement between that party and her attorney, as well as proof of any money paid as 
attorney fees.”  SUP. CT. ISR., GUIDELINES OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT 
(2010), available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/heb/dover/html/hanchayot_new.pdf.  The second part of 
the Barak administrative guidance remained in place, however.  See id.  Conversations we held with 
numerous attorneys and judges suggest that, in practice, parties rarely introduce retainer agree-
ments into evidence. 
75. See, e.g., Avery Wiener Katz, Indemnity of Legal Fees, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS: THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND LITIGATION 63, 64–65 (Boudewijn Bouckaert 
& Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000). 
76. DINIM, http://www.dinimveod.co.il/Default.aspx (last visited May 14, 2013). 
77. Telephone Conversation with Michal Vinograd, Gen. Manager of Dinim (June 2011). 
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ceedings were permitted to file interlocutory appeals from every decision made by 
the court during trial.78  We dropped such interlocutory appeals from the study.  
Our final sample consists of 1140 cases. 
We tested the comprehensiveness and accuracy of the Dinim database by 
comparing it with data obtained from Israel’s official court system website, Net 
Hamishpat.79  Although Net Hamishpat does not provide information relating 
to all district courts operating during 2005 and 2006, the partial data that it does 
provide suggest that the data obtained from the Dinim website are indeed 
comprehensive and accurate.  The data thus provide a complete picture of district 
court civil case activity in the periods covered and a sound basis for assessing how 
the courts rule with respect to litigation costs in civil cases. 
The data are subject to some limitations.  First, the study covers only final 
decisions in civil matters, thus omitting cases terminated in a different manner—
via settlement, dismissal, or judgment by way of settlement under section 79A of 
the Courts’ Law.80  Second, the study excludes interlocutory decisions.  Third, the 
study relates to the district court level only, excluding the magistrates’ courts and 
the ISC.  Fourth, the study covers only civil courts of general jurisdiction, thereby 
excluding specialized courts such as family courts, rabbinical courts, labor courts, 
and military courts.  Fifth, since the study covers only a limited period, trends 
over time cannot be assessed.  We thus examine only a small doctrinally impor-
tant slice of a broader universe of court activity. 
Student research assistants coded cases, which a second group of more 
experienced students randomly sampled for accuracy.  Prior to the student coding, 
the authors designed a data form to structure the coding.  The performance of the 
form and the students was reviewed in an initial set of cases, the form was revised 
in light of that experience, and a final form was constructed.  The students used 
that revised form to code the cases, under the supervision of the authors.  Because 
of the importance of case categories in understanding litigation outcomes,81 we 
coded cases into nine civil case categories based on the first claim listed in the 
petition.  Table 1 shows the number of the 1140 cases in each case category, 
further subdivided by the districts that finally decided the cases. 
Most case categories involve the kinds of cases one would expect in any legal 
system, but some require additional explanation in light of distinctive Israeli law.  
  
78. In 2009, the Minister of Justice issued a decree limiting the scope of such interlocutory appeals under the 
authority granted to him by a 2008 amendment to the 1984 Courts Act.  See Courts Decree (Types of 
Decisions on Which No Interlocutory Appeal Would Be Granted) (2009) (on file with authors). 
79. NET HAMISHPAT, http://www.hamishpat.co.il (last visited May 14, 2013). 
80. See Courts Act § 79 A (Isr.). 
81. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending Empiricism, 
77 CORNELL L. REV. 1124, 1138 (1992) (“Case categories are of central importance.”). 
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Since 2000, most cases that deal with administrative law are under the 
jurisdiction of either Israel’s specialized administrative courts or the ISC in its 
HCJ capacity.  Our sample does not include cases from either of these courts.  
Regular civil courts, including district courts, have residual administrative law ju-
risdiction and deal mostly with restitution claims in administrative matters.  
These claims are a small minority of cases on the administrative docket and only 
eight of them are in our sample.  With respect to arbitration cases, the Arbitration 
Act of 1968 allows parties to arbitration to resort to court during the arbitration 
process or following its conclusion.  During the arbitration, the court has the 
power to intervene in various procedural aspects of the arbitration.82  But the most 
significant and prevalent jurisdiction of courts is to invalidate a final arbitration 
decision for reasons specified in the Act.83  Expropriation cases involve govern-
ment condemnation of property. 
About 80 percent of the case sample consists of three major civil case 
categories which we coded as Contract, Property, and Tort.  Substantial 
interdistrict variety existed in the distribution of case categories.  Contract cases 
dominated in Tel Aviv, Tort cases in Haifa and Jerusalem, and Property cases in 
Nazareth.  Cases were most evenly distributed across the major case categories in 
Beer Sheva. 
  
82. See Arbitration Law, 5728-1968, ch. 2 (Isr.). 
83. See id. § 24 (Isr.) (listing ten bases for setting aside or modifying an arbitration award). 




TABLE 1.  Distribution of Sample Cases by Case Category and District 
 Beer Sheva Haifa Jerusalem Nazareth Tel Aviv Total N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Administrative 
Law 3 3.9 4 1.1 3 1.8 0 0.0 12 2.8 22 1.9 
Arbitration 11 14.5 39 10.3 1 0.6 0 0.0 3 0.7 54 4.7 
Banking 1 1.3 9 2.4 2 1.2 1 1.1 14 3.2 27 2.4 
Contract 14 18.4 53 14.0 42 25.3 19 21.3 166 38.5 294 25.8 
Corporations 
Law 2 2.6 9 2.4 2 1.2 2 2.2 13 3.0 28 2.5 
Expropriation 3 3.9 2 0.5 2 1.2 6 6.7 7 1.6 20 1.8 
Property 19 25.0 76 20.1 43 25.9 48 53.9 78 18.1 264 23.2 
Tort 21 27.6 160 42.3 64 38.6 6 6.7 109 25.3 360 31.6 
Other 2 2.6 26 6.9 7 4.2 7 7.9 29 6.7 71 6.2 
Total 76 100 378 100 166 100 89 100 431 100 1140 100 
Source: Dinim database of Israeli civil district court cases that were adjudicated on the merits and 
terminated in 2005–06. 
B. Descriptive Statistics 
In addition to the district and case category variables described in Table 1, 
two other variables play a central role in our analysis: which party prevailed and 
the status of the parties as plaintiffs or defendants. 
Parties who lose generally cannot expect to be awarded litigation costs and 
parties who win have some expectation of recovering such costs.  It is therefore 
critical to track which party prevailed in a case.  Of the 1140 case outcomes, plain-
tiffs prevailed fully in 320 cases, prevailed in part in 353 cases (by, for example, not 
recovering the full amount requested), and were denied relief in 467 cases.  For 
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purposes of our analysis, we treat plaintiffs who prevailed in part as having won, 
though we also report whether this decision influences key results.84   
Table 2 reports the prevailing party for nine combinations of plaintiff and 
defendant party status.  Party status throughout this Article is based on the first 
named plaintiff or defendant in each case and is divided into the three categories: 
Individual, Corporation, and Government.  We did not distinguish among the 
various government entities that litigated. 
 
TABLE 2.  Prevailing Party by Plaintiff-Defendant  
Party Status Combination 
Plaintiff-Defendant 
Combination 
Defendant Won Plaintiff Won
N % N % Total
Individual v. 
Individual 118 35.0 219 65.0 337 
Individual v. 
Corporation 125 37.0 213 63.0 338 
Individual v. 
Government 89 63.1 52 36.9 141 
Corporation v. 
Individual 23 39.7 35 60.3 58 
Corporation v. 
Corporation 66 39.5 101 60.5 167 
Corporation v. 
Government 28 45.9 33 54.1 61 
Government v. 
Individual 9 47.4 10 52.6 19 
Government v. 
Corporation 7 50.0 7 50.0 14 
Government v. 
Government 2 40.0 3 60.0 5 
Total 467 41.0 673 59.0 1140
Source: Dinim database of Israeli civil district court cases that were adjudicated on the merits and 
terminated in 2005–06. 
 
  
84. For a discussion on the ambiguities in defining case outcomes, see, for example, Theodore Eisenberg 
& Stewart Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 641, 676 
(1987), which argues that formally successful actions might be de facto failures and formal losses may 
indirectly achieve desired goals. 
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Table 2 shows substantial variation in win rates for the plaintiff-defendant 
party status combinations.  Individuals suing governmental entities were the least 
successful plaintiff-defendant combination with a substantial number of cases; 
plaintiffs prevailing in 36.9 percent of cases compared to an overall plaintiff suc-
cess rate of 59.0 percent.  This is the only combination in which plaintiffs pre-
vailed at less than a 50 percent rate.  Individuals suing other individuals and 
corporations suing individuals or other corporations all prevailed in 60.3 percent 
to 65.0 percent of cases.  Table 2’s win rates provide a baseline for the expected 
rate of litigation cost awards to various types of parties if Israel’s judges always fol-
low the loser pays rule. 
The varying win rates across plaintiff-defendant party status combinations, 
combined with the known importance of case categories, suggests that understand-
ing the relation between these factors is critical to understanding litigation cost 
award patterns.  For example, an individual plaintiff suing a corporate defendant 
in tort may generate a different reaction from a judge awarding litigation costs 
than a corporate plaintiff suing a corporate defendant in contract. 
Table 3 reports the number of cases in each case category for each plaintiff-
defendant party status combination.  Government plaintiff cases are not shown, 
both in the interest of space and because there were too few such cases to rea-
sonably subdivide across case categories.  The first row for each case category 
shows the number of cases for each plaintiff-defendant combination.  The sec-
ond row for each case category shows the column percentage for the particular 
combination.  For example, the first entry in the first row shows that there was one 
Administrative Law case in which an individual sued another individual.  The 
corresponding entry in the second row shows that this one case comprised 0.30 
percent of all cases involving suits by individuals against individuals. 




TABLE 3.  Distribution of Cases by Case Categories and Plaintiff-
Defendant Party Status Combination 
 Individual Plaintiffs Corporate Plaintiffs  













1 0 9 0 0 10 20 
0.30 0.00 6.38 0.00 0.00 16.39 1.81 
Arbitration 11 10 2 6 12 4 45 3.26 2.96 1.42 10.34 7.19 6.56 4.08 
Banking 0 9 0 7 10 0 26 0.00 2.66 0.00 12.07 5.99 0.00 2.36 
Contract 71 62 10 22 88 31 284 21.07 18.34 7.09 37.93 52.69 50.82 25.77 
Corporations 
Law 
5 16 0 4 3 0 28 
1.48 4.73 0.00 6.90 1.80 0.00 2.54 
Expropriation 0 1 16 0 1 0 18 0.00 0.30 11.35 0.00 0.60 0.00 1.63 
Property 126 56 40 7 24 5 258 37.39 16.57 28.37 12.07 14.37 8.20 23.41 
Tort 104 170 55 8 18 5 360 30.86 50.30 39.01 13.79 10.78 8.20 32.67 
Other 19 14 9 4 11 6 63 5.64 4.14 6.38 6.90 6.59 9.84 5.72 
Total 337 338 141 58 167 61 1102 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Note: This table excludes thirty-eight cases in which governmental entities were plaintiffs. 
Source: Dinim database of Israeli civil district court cases that were adjudicated on the merits and 
terminated in 2005–06. 
 
Table 3 shows that Property cases constituted a substantially higher 
proportion of individual plaintiff cases than of corporate plaintiff cases.  Property 
cases comprised 37 percent of cases filed by individuals against other individuals, 
17 percent of cases filed by individuals against corporations, and 28 percent of 
cases filed by individuals against governmental entities.  When corporations were 
plaintiffs, the percentage of Property cases was lower regardless of the party status 
of the defendant.  Tort cases were most prominent in suits by individuals against 
corporations or governmental entities.  For example, Tort cases comprised more than 
half of all actions filed by individuals against corporations.  But Tort actions comprised 
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only a small fraction of cases filed by corporate plaintiffs.  Contract actions were the 
most prevalent case category for corporate plaintiffs.  Contract actions also consti-
tuted the highest percentage of all cases, regardless of defendant status, and ac-
counted for more than half of all actions against corporate and government 
defendants. 
IV. RESULTS 
Assessing judicial behavior with respect to litigation cost awards requires a 
measure of that behavior.  More than one award outcome is of potential interest.  
The amount of the award is of obvious importance, as is the relation of that 
amount to other factors, such as the amount at stake in a given case or the size of 
the recovery.  But the question whether any litigation costs are awarded is logically 
antecedent to the amount of the award and that amount’s relation to other factors.  
The basic dividing line between litigation cost award systems, however blurred 
that line may be in actual practice, is whether the prevailing party has a right to 
recover its litigation costs.  We therefore employed whether litigation costs were 
denied to the prevailing party as our outcome measure and termed this outcome 
variable “litigation cost denial.”  We coded this variable as “1” when a judge award-
ed the prevailing party no litigation costs and as “0” when a judge awarded any 
litigation cost amount.  We excluded forty cases from our analysis because they 
contained no information on whether litigation costs had been awarded.  If per-
ceptions about Israeli judges as generally applying a loser pays rule are correct, 
denials of litigation costs should be rare. 
  We first investigate the relations between our outcome variable “litigation 
cost denial” and explanatory variables of primary interest: plaintiff-defendant party 
status combination, case category, and judicial district.  We then report the results 
of regression models that simultaneously account for the relations between denials 
and multiple explanatory variables. 
A. Bivariate Results 
Table 4 shows the denial rate for litigation costs as a function of case 
category and as a function of whether plaintiff or defendant prevailed.  In cases 
won by defendants, the highest rates of litigation cost denials occurred in the 
categories of Tort, Administrative Law, and Expropriation.  Prevailing defen-
dants were denied litigation costs in 42 percent of Tort cases, 33 percent of Ad-
ministrative Law cases, and 29 percent of Expropriation cases.  By contrast, pre-
vailing plaintiffs were never denied litigation costs in Expropriation cases and 
were rarely denied litigation costs in Tort cases.  The highest rate of litigation cost 
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denials for prevailing plaintiffs was a 36 percent denial rate in Property cases, a 
rate that substantially exceeded the denial rates in the two other large case cate-
gories of Tort and Contract.  Overall, prevailing defendants were denied litigation 
costs at noticeably higher rates than prevailing plaintiffs, though substantial 
variation across case categories counsels against putting too much weight on 
these aggregate figures.  The significance levels in Table 4’s last row report the 
results of tests of the hypothesis that litigation cost denial rates are independent of 
case category.  The reported significance levels, which are less than p=0.001 for 
cases won by both plaintiffs and defendants, support rejecting the hypothesis of 
independence.  Thus, statistically significant variation in denial rates exists 
across case categories for cases won by both plaintiffs and defendants. 
 
TABLE 4.  Litigation Cost Denial Rates by Case Category  
and Prevailing Party 
Case category Defendant Won Plaintiff Won Total 
Administrative Law (n=22) 0.33 0.30 0.32 
Arbitration (n=52) 0.04 0.33 0.19 
Banking (n=26) 0.00 0.20 0.12 
Contract (n=293) 0.28 0.15 0.21 
Corporations Law (n=28) 0.25 0.25 0.25 
Expropriation (n=17) 0.29 0.00 0.12 
Property (n=254) 0.21 0.36 0.29 
Tort (n=359) 0.42 0.04 0.16 
Other (n=71) 0.09 0.16 0.13 
Total (n=1122) 0.26 0.16 0.20 
Significance p<0.001 p<0.001  
Note: Reported significance levels account for the nonindependence of decisions by the same judge.   
Source: Dinim database of Israeli civil district court cases that were adjudicated on the merits and termi-
nated in 2005–06. 
 
Within the Tort category, automobile accident cases were by far the most 
numerous, comprising about 42 percent of the category.85  They also showed 
slightly lower litigation cost denial rates for prevailing plaintiffs than other Tort 
  
85. By comparison, in the United States in 2005, automobile accident cases constituted nearly 60 percent 
of state court tort trials.  THOMAS H. COHEN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 228129, CIVIL 
JUSTICE SURVEY OF STATE COURTS: TORT BENCH AND JURY TRIALS IN STATE COURTS, 
2005, at 1 (2009).  In our data, professional malpractice cases accounted for 16.7 percent of terminated 
Israeli tort cases.  In the United States in 2005, medical malpractice cases comprised 15 percent of 
state court tort trials, and other professional malpractice cases comprised about 1 percent of such 
trials.  Id. at 1–2. 
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cases.  The 4 percent rate of denials in cases in which plaintiffs prevailed consists 
of a 6.9 percent denial rate in 116 nonautomobile Tort cases and a 1.5 percent 
denial rate in 134 automobile accident cases, a difference significant at p=0.046.  
In Tort cases in which defendants prevailed, the 42 percent litigation cost denial 
rate consists of a 40.9 percent denial rate in ninety-three nonautomobile cases 
and a 50 percent denial rate in sixteen automobile cases, a difference which is not 
statistically significant (p=0.587). 
Table 4’s results are largely insensitive to whether plaintiffs prevailed in whole 
or in part.  Overall, prevailing plaintiffs were denied litigation costs in 14.4 percent 
of cases in which their claims were accepted in whole, compared to 18.1 percent of 
cases in which their claims were accepted in part.  These low rates of denials persist 
in Tort and Expropriation cases regardless of whether plaintiffs’ claims were ac-
cepted in whole or in part.  High rates of denials persist in those two case categories 
in cases won by defendants, regardless of whether defendants prevailed in whole or 
in part.  The one exception to this general pattern occurs in Contract cases won by 
plaintiffs.  In Contract cases in which plaintiffs’ claims were accepted in whole, 
litigation costs were denied to prevailing plaintiffs in only 6.9 percent of fifty-eight 
cases.  In Contract cases in which plaintiffs’ claims were only accepted in part, 
litigation costs were denied to prevailing plaintiffs in 19.4 percent of 103 cases. 
Table 4 shows frequent litigation cost denials in some case categories and a 
natural question is what prompts judges to depart from the loser pays norm.  Illus-
trative fact patterns can supply contextual background about denial rates.  We theref-
ore describe litigation cost denials that occurred in a Tort case and an Expropriation 
case—two classes of cases with high denial rates when defendants prevailed. 
Shuki Tal v. Migdal Insurance LTD86 was a Tort case in which the plaintiff 
was involved in a car accident that caused him extensive bodily injuries.  The 
plaintiff filed a suit based on the Road Accident Victim Compensation Law of 
1976 against his insurance company arguing that the accident had severely 
harmed his functional abilities and rendered him unable to work.87  The suit was 
filed only days before the expiration of the statute of limitations period on the 
cause of action.88  At first, the defendant insurance companies did not deny lia-
bility.  But two years into the trial they changed course and argued that at the 
time of the accident the plaintiff was not covered by his insurance policy because 
his driver’s license had been disqualified and was thus invalid.  The central issues 
to be decided were (1) whether the plaintiff had a valid driver’s license at the time 
  
86. CC (TA) 1214/96 (unpublished, Nov. 5, 2006). 
87. See id. para. 1. 
88. See id. para. 3. 
1476 60 UCLA L. REV. 1452 (2013) 
 
 
of the accident; (2) if he did not, whether he was aware that his driver’s license 
was invalid; and (3) if he was, whether a court decision annulling the driver’s 
license disqualification would apply retroactively.  The court concluded that the 
plaintiff’s driver’s license had been invalid at the time of the accident, that he was 
aware of this fact, and that the annulment of the disqualification did not apply 
retroactively.89  The court therefore ruled in favor of the defendants.  In light of 
the circumstances and the conduct of the parties during the litigation, however, 
the court decided that each party would bear its own costs.90 
Heirs of the Late Ahmad Mustafa Abed v. State of Israel 91 was an Expropriation 
case involving government condemnation of the plaintiffs’ property in Nazareth.  
The plaintiffs were the sole heirs of the late Ahmad Mustafa Abed, who had been 
the prior owner of the property.92  Upon his death, the plaintiffs inherited the 
property, but the state expropriated the property in 1976.93  The dispute revolved 
around the compensation amount the government should pay.  The appraiser ap-
pointed by the state set the value of the property significantly lower than the value 
ascribed to it by the plaintiffs’ appraiser.94  The court accepted the state’s appraisal, 
but it denied the government its litigation costs in light of the fact that the state had 
updated its appraisal prior to the commencement of the legal proceeding.95 
Table 5 shows the rate at which litigation costs were denied as a function of 
plaintiff-defendant party status combination and prevailing party.  The lowest rate 
of denials for a combination with a substantial number of cases occurred in cases in 
which individual plaintiffs prevailed against corporations; litigation costs were 
denied in only 8 percent of such cases.  When individual or governmental 
defendants prevailed in actions brought by governmental plaintiffs, courts never 
denied litigation costs.  The small numbers of such cases, however, counsel against 
putting too much emphasis on this result.   
The highest rate of litigation cost denials for a combination with a substantial 
number of cases was the 37 percent denial rate in cases won by the government as 
defendant against individual plaintiffs.  When defendants prevailed, the three 
highest rates of denials for party status combinations with substantial numbers of 
cases all involved individual plaintiffs.  This suggests that courts were more pro-
tective of individual plaintiffs who brought unsuccessful cases than of corporate 
plaintiffs who lost.  Consolidating the nine possible party status combinations into 
  
89. See id. para. 4–6. 
90. See id. 
91. CC (Nazareth) 1127/04 (unpublished, Apr. 2, 2006). 
92. See id. para. 2. 
93. See id. para. 3. 
94. See id. para. 7. 
95. See id. para. 13. 
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three combinations based on the individual, corporate, or governmental status of 
the plaintiff—regardless of the party status of the defendant—resulted in a 
statistically significant difference in denial rates based on the party status of the 
plaintiff in cases in which defendants prevailed, but not in cases in which plaintiffs 
prevailed.  This suggests that the greater protection provided to losing individual 
plaintiffs through higher litigation cost denial rates was unlikely to occur by chance. 
 
TABLE 5.  Rate of Litigation Cost Denial, by Plaintiff-Defendant Party 







Individual v. Individual 
(n=333) 0.31 0.24 0.27 
Individual v. 
Corporation (n=337) 0.24 0.08 0.14 
Individual v. 
Government (n=131) 0.37 0.20 0.31 
Corporation v. 
Individual (n=58) 0.09 0.17 0.14 
Corporation v. 
Corporation (n=164) 0.23 0.13 0.17 
Corporation v. 
Government (n=61) 0.14 0.18 0.16 
Government v. 
Individual (n=19) 0.00 0.10 0.05 
Government v. 
Corporation (n=14) 0.43 0.29 0.36 
Government v. 
Government (n=5) 0.00 0.67 0.40 
Total (n=1122) 0.26 0.16 0.20 
Significance  
(9 Combinations) p=0.052 p=0.016  
Significance  
(3 Plaintiff Categories) p=0.025 p=0.551  
Note: Reported significance levels account for the nonindependence of decisions by the same judge.  The 
significance level reported for three plaintiff categories is based on plaintiffs as individuals, corporations, or the 
government without regard to defendant status.   
Source: Dinim database of Israeli civil district court cases that were adjudicated on the merits and 
terminated in 2005–06. 




Table 5’s results are largely insensitive to whether one distinguishes between 
cases in which plaintiffs prevailed in whole or in part.  Substantial differences in 
denial rates, however, emerged for some plaintiff-defendant combinations.  In 
cases in which individual plaintiffs prevailed against the government and 
plaintiffs’ claims were accepted in whole, for example, litigation costs were denied 
in 9 percent of cases (2 of 22).  When individual plaintiffs’ claims were accepted 
in part, on the other hand, litigation costs were denied in 29.6 percent of cases (8 
of 27), a difference that is marginally statistically significant at p=0.072.96  In cases 
in which corporate plaintiffs succeeded in whole against corporate defendants, 
litigation costs were denied in only 2 percent of cases (1 of 47).  In cases in which 
corporate plaintiffs succeeded in part against corporate defendants, however, 
litigation costs were denied in 23.5 percent of cases (12 of 51), a difference 
statistically significant at p=0.001. 
Table 6 shows the rate at which litigation costs were denied as a function of 
judicial district and prevailing party.  The most striking result is the 56 percent 
denial rate in cases won by plaintiffs in Nazareth.  We defer further analysis of the 
Nazareth district to Part V. 
 
TABLE 6.  Rate of Litigation Cost Denial by Judicial District  
and Prevailing Party 
Judicial District Defendant Won
Plaintiff 
Won Total 
Beer Sheva (n=67) 0.38 0.15 0.27 
Haifa (n=376) 0.24 0.13 0.17 
Jerusalem (n=165) 0.30 0.10 0.19 
Nazareth (n=85) 0.29 0.56 0.46 
Tel Aviv (n=429) 0.24 0.13 0.18 
Total (n=1122) 0.26 0.16 0.20 
Significance p=0.628 p<0.001
Note: The significance levels account for the nonindependence of decisions by the same judge.   
Source: Dinim database of Israeli civil district court cases that were adjudicated on the merits and 
terminated in 2005–06. 
 
Table 6’s results for Tel Aviv differed for cases in which plaintiffs prevailed 
in whole or in part.  In cases in which plaintiffs prevailed in whole, litigation costs 
  
96. Significance levels reported in the text account for the nonindependence of decisions by the same 
judge. 
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were denied in 7.6 percent of cases (8 of 105).  When plaintiffs’ claims were 
accepted in part, litigation costs were denied in 17.7 percent of cases (23 of 130), 
a difference marginally significant at p=0.067. 
B. Regression Analysis 
Because multiple factors of interest may be associated with litigation cost de-
nials, regression analysis is useful in assessing the degree to which Part IV.A’s 
bivariate results persist when explanatory factors are taken into account simulta-
neously.  Since the outcome variable “litigation cost denial” is dichotomous, we em-
ploy logistic regression.97 
Table 5 suggested that plaintiff-defendant status combinations are 
significantly associated with litigation cost denial rates, at least when defendants 
prevail.  It is therefore important to include plaintiff-defendant party status 
combinations as explanatory variables in our regression models.  Further, Tables 
4–6 suggest that whether plaintiff or defendant prevailed can be important in 
assessing whether litigation costs were denied.  To isolate the effect of plaintiff-
defendant party status while also accounting for prevailing party, we modeled liti-
gation cost denials separately for cases in which plaintiffs prevailed and cases in 
which defendants prevailed.98  Table 7 confirms the propriety of creating such sep-
arate models, as it shows that covariates often differ in size and significance based 
on the prevailing party.  Tables 2 and 5 showed that the government was the 
plaintiff in few cases.  For purposes of our regression models, we therefore com-
bined the government plaintiff categories into a single category of government as 
plaintiff without distinguishing among defendants by party status. 
With respect to individuals as defendants, we initially conducted a separate 
analysis that coded for the presence of a family as a group of defendants.  Fifty-
one cases involved such a family group defendant, and forty-nine of these cases 
had information about the prevailing party.  About 70 percent of the family 
group cases involved Property or Contract claims, and 49 percent were comprised 
of Property claims.  Plaintiffs won 63 percent of these cases (31 of 49) but 
litigation costs were denied in 48.4 percent of them.  This litigation cost denial 
  
97. See generally A. COLIN CAMERON & PRAVIN K. TRIVEDI, MICROECONOMETRICS USING 
STATA 459 (rev. ed. 2010) (discussing logistic regression). 
98. An alternative approach would be to construct variables that measure the interaction between the 
party status variables (that is, the plaintiff-defendant party status combinations) and the prevailing 
party variable.  Interacting the nine plaintiff-defendant party status combinations with the two 
prevailing party values would lead to eighteen possible plaintiff-defendant/prevailing-party-
interaction dummy variables.  We explored these models, but they were less than satisfactory in 
terms of fitting the data and resulted in multicollinearity problems. 
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rate is far higher than the 14.7 percent denial rate in cases won by plaintiffs that 
did not involve a family group as defendants.  We therefore initially included a 
family-group-defendant dummy variable in our models.  This variable turned out 
to be statistically insignificant, however, likely due to its overlap with the Property 
case category and was therefore dropped from our models. 
We also included additional explanatory variables to account for the factors 
that Part IV.A or Israel’s legal rules governing litigation costs suggest may matter 
in judges’ litigation cost allocation decisions.  Table 4, for example, showed the 
importance of case categories and Table 6 showed the importance of judicial 
districts, so we included dummy variables for each of these factors.  Furthermore, 
since RCP Rule 512 instructs courts to base their litigation cost rulings in part on 
the amount or value of the relief requested and the remedy granted by the court, 
we also included variables for whether a plaintiff prevailed in whole or in part and 
for whether nonmonetary relief was granted in the models of cases won by 
plaintiffs.  The sample contains decisions by ninety-eight different district court 
judges and we clustered the standard errors by the identity of the judge to account 
for the nonindependence of decisions rendered by the same judge. 
Table 7 reports the regression results.  Models (1) and (3) include only cases 
won by plaintiffs and models (2) and (4) include only cases won by defendants.  
Due to the small number of cases in some case categories, we added Ad-
ministrative Law cases, Banking cases, and Corporations Law cases to the residual 
category of cases, “Other.”  The table reports the marginal effects of the explan-
atory variables on the outcome variable.  The marginal effects are interpretable as 
the change in the probability of a litigation cost denial given a one-unit change in 
an explanatory variable.  For categorical explanatory variables, this change in prob-
ability is in comparison to a reference category—that is, a value of the explanatory 
variable against which changes in the outcome probability are measured.  The 
reference category for the plaintiff-defendant/prevailing-party combinations, for 
example, is Individual vs. Individual.  This means that the coefficients for the 
other plaintiff-defendant/prevailing-party combinations in Table 7 indicate how 
much more or less likely a litigation cost denial becomes as compared to the 
baseline case of a suit between two individuals.  Jerusalem is the reference category 
for judicial district in all four models.  In models (1) and (2), Tort is the reference 
category for case categories. 
Because Table 4 showed that Tort cases are distinctive, we also constructed 
models limited to non-Tort cases to assess whether the large group of Tort cases 
drives our results using the full sample.  In models (3) and (4), which exclude Tort 
cases, the reference case category is the residual category Other.  We ran similar 
models with variables for the gender and ethnicity of plaintiffs and defendants, as 
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well as for cases in which one party was represented by counsel while the other 
was not.99  None of these variables was statistically significant and we therefore do 
not report these models’ results. 
 
















-0.130*** - -0.233*** - 
(0.024) - (0.044) - 
Nonmonetary 
Relief 
0.087** 0.036 0.129*** 0.017 
(0.037) (0.066) (0.048) (0.059) 
Individual v. 
Corporation 
-0.061* -0.070 -0.069 -0.102** 
(0.031) (0.044) (0.056) (0.049) 
Individual v. 
Government 
0.042 0.006 0.109 -0.033 
(0.055) (0.067) (0.107) (0.059) 
Corporation v. 
Individual
-0.039 -0.177*** -0.089 -0.115* 
(0.042) (0.050) (0.075) (0.062) 
Corporation v. 
Corporation 
-0.042 -0.081 -0.067 -0.020 
(0.032) (0.057) (0.068) (0.057) 
Corporation v. 
Government 
-0.033 -0.137** -0.051 -0.114* 
(0.036) (0.066) (0.069) (0.066) 
Government 
Plaintiff 
-0.012 -0.075 -0.009 -0.052 
(0.047) (0.069) (0.091) (0.065) 
Beer Sheva 0.057 0.116 0.140 0.226 (0.073) (0.128) (0.126) (0.149) 
Haifa 0.017 -0.074 0.032 0.035 (0.043) (0.071) (0.079) (0.089) 
Nazareth 0.379*** -0.016 0.497*** 0.096 (0.126) (0.093) (0.143) (0.126) 
Tel Aviv 0.035 -0.053 0.068 0.028 (0.047) (0.074) (0.081) (0.092) 
Arbitration 0.352** -0.248*** 0.070 -0.171*** (0.142) (0.033) (0.084) (0.049) 
  
99. Nonrepresentation almost uniformly consisted of plaintiffs having counsel and defendants not hav-
ing counsel.  It was most prevalent in Nazareth, which included twenty of the thirty-eight pro se 
defendant cases, nineteen of which were Property cases. 
















Contract 0.125** -0.101* -0.092 0.120* (0.061) (0.057) (0.069) (0.066) 
Other 0.252** -0.193*** - - (0.116) (0.046) - - 
Property 0.246*** -0.192*** 0.020 0.027 (0.073) (0.045) (0.074) (0.062) 




17.6% 5.8% 16.3% 4.0% 
Pseudo  
R-Squared 0.243 0.086 0.180 0.068 
Observations 652 460 402 351 
Note: The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable for which 1 represents a litigation cost denial.  
The proportionate reduction in error compares the models’ predicted outcomes to the rate of error using 
the modal outcome (no denial of litigation costs) as the prediction in each case.  Standard errors, 
clustered by judge, are in parentheses.  * indicates p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.   
Source: Dinim database of Israeli civil district court cases that were adjudicated on the merits and 
terminated in 2005–06. 
 
The coefficient on “Claim Fully Accepted” in model (1) indicates that full 
acceptance of a plaintiff’s claim, in contrast to partial acceptance or denial of the 
claim, is strongly, negatively, and statistically significantly associated with a court 
not ordering payment of litigation costs.  Full acceptance of a claim decreases the 
probability of a litigation cost denial by 13 percent.  When the sample is limited 
to non-Tort cases in model (3), this effect is even stronger with a 23.3 percent 
decrease in the probability of a litigation cost denial upon full acceptance of a 
plaintiff’s claim.  This result can be interpreted as showing that judges implement 
RCP Rule 512’s instruction to consider the degree to which a prevailing party 
succeeded on its claims.  The size and statistical significance of the “Nonmonetary 
Relief” variable coefficient in models (1) and (3) also suggests that judges take 
seriously RCP Rule 512’s instruction to take account of the nature of the relief 
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granted when deciding on whether to award the prevailing party its litigation 
costs.100  We next describe the case category, party status, and district results. 
1. Case Categories 
Table 4 showed high litigation cost denial rates in Tort and Expropriation 
cases won by defendants, low denial rates in Banking cases won by defendants, 
and low denial rates in Tort and Expropriation cases won by plaintiffs.  Models 
(1) and (2) confirm that these results persist when one accounts for other 
explanatory factors. 
In model (1), the coefficients for all case category dummy variables are 
positive, indicating a higher probability of litigation cost denials when plaintiffs 
win non-Tort cases than when they win Tort cases.  These coefficients are all 
statistically significant.  Winning Tort plaintiffs tend to be awarded litigation 
costs more frequently than plaintiffs who prevail on non-Tort claims.  Expro-
priation cases were excluded from model (1) because there was no variation in the 
variable: As shown in Table 4, litigation costs were never denied in such cases. 
When plaintiffs lost Tort cases, on the other hand, they tended not to be 
assessed their adversary’s litigation costs.  In model (2), all case category coefficients 
other than Expropriation are substantial and negative, and all coefficients except 
Expropriation are either statistically significant or marginally statistically sig-
nificant. 
The results for Arbitration cases won by plaintiffs are striking.  Model (1) 
shows that prevailing Arbitration plaintiffs were 35.2 percent more likely to be 
denied litigation costs than prevailing plaintiffs in Tort cases.  Denial rates in Arbi-
tration cases in model (1) also significantly differed from denial rates in Contract 
cases (p=0.042).  In model (2), denial rates in Arbitration cases significantly 
differed only from those in Tort cases, and the intercategory variation outside of 
Tort cases was generally lower than in model (1).  In model (3), Arbitration cases 
had the highest rates of litigation cost denials when plaintiffs won, and the 
difference between denial rates in Arbitration cases and Contract cases was 
statistically significant (p=0.031).  Model (4) shows that, excluding Tort cases 
from the analysis, Contract cases had the highest rates of litigation cost denials 
when defendants won—denial rates were 12 percent higher than in the Other 
reference category.  Contract denial rates in model (4) only marginally signifi-
  
100. 53 percent of nonmonetary relief cases won by plaintiffs were Property cases.  Nonmonetary relief 
dominated the Arbitration (28 of 29 cases won by plaintiffs) and Property (124 of 146 cases won 
by plaintiffs) case categories.  This helps explain the prominence of the nonmonetary relief node 
in Figure 1, infra. 
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cantly differed from denial rates in Property cases (p=0.074).  Litigation cost 
denial rates in Expropriation cases were similar to those in Contract cases, but the 
Expropriation category had so few cases that this result merits little emphasis. 
2. Plaintiff-Defendant Combinations 
Table 5 suggested high rates of litigation cost denials when individual 
plaintiffs prevailed against individual defendants.  That five of the six plaintiff-
defendant combination coefficients in model (1) are negative—indicating that 
litigation cost denials were less likely in such cases than in the reference category 
of Individual v. Individual—is consistent with this, as is one of the coefficients 
differing marginally statistically significantly from the reference category.  The 
positive sign on the coefficient for Individual v. Government is the one exception 
to this pattern, but this coefficient is not close to being statistically significant.  In 
general, the coefficients for the plaintiff-defendant combination variables were 
modest in model (1).  The range of their observed effect was only about a 10 
percent difference in the probability of a litigation cost denial compared to a case 
between two individuals.  The denial rate for individual plaintiffs prevailing 
against corporate defendants, however, was significantly lower than the denial 
rate for individual plaintiffs prevailing against the government (p=0.017).  
Prevailing government plaintiffs were less likely to be denied litigation costs than 
individuals who prevailed against other individuals, but this result was not 
statistically significant.  These results are reasonably consistent with Table 5’s 
report of the bivariate relation between litigation cost denial and party status. 
In model (2)’s regression of litigation cost denials for prevailing defendants, 
some larger effects emerge.  The negative sign on five of the six plaintiff-
defendant combination coefficients suggests that winning defendants were likely 
to be denied litigation costs when they were individuals who prevailed against 
individual plaintiffs.  This denial effect is substantial, and highly statistically 
significant, when compared to both the 13.7 percent lower probability of a 
litigation cost denial when government defendants prevailed against corporate 
plaintiffs and the 17.7 percent lower probability of a denial when corporate 
defendants prevailed against individual plaintiffs.  The only coefficient for a 
plaintiff-defendant combination with a positive sign, Individual v. Government, 
was near zero and far from statistically significant. These results are reasonably 
consistent with Table 5’s bivariate results.  As Table 5 also suggested, the large and 
negative sizes of the coefficients for cases lost by corporate plaintiffs indicate that 
judges are reluctant to deny litigation costs when corporate plaintiffs lose. As 
Table 5 also suggested, when defendants prevailed the three highest rates of liti-
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gation cost denials all involved individual plaintiffs—the reference category of In-
dividual v. Individual, Individual v. Corporation, and Individual v. Government.  
Together, these results suggest that judges tended to protect losing individual 
plaintiffs against litigation cost awards. 
When one excludes Tort cases in model (3), the results for the plaintiff-
defendant combinations do not change dramatically but vary in size.  As in model 
(1), five of the six party status coefficients are negative, suggesting that judges 
were relatively more likely to deny litigation costs in cases in which individuals 
prevailed against individuals.  The coefficients tend to be larger negative numbers 
in model (3) than in model (1), suggesting a stronger denial effect for individual 
plaintiffs who prevailed against individual defendants in non-Tort cases. 
Model (4), which analyzes non-Tort cases in which defendants prevailed, 
shows a negative sign on all of the party status coefficients, again suggesting that 
prevailing defendants were most likely to be denied litigation costs when they 
were individuals who prevailed against individual plaintiffs.  Three of the party 
status coefficients significantly differed or marginally significantly differed from 
the reference category.  The coefficients for the individual plaintiff categories in 
model (4) show a less clear pattern of protecting individuals than those in model 
(2).  This suggests that judges are especially likely to protect individuals in Tort 
cases. 
3. Districts 
Both models of cases with prevailing plaintiffs (models (1) and (3)) suggest 
that the Nazareth district court was more willing to deny litigation costs in such 
cases than other district courts.  This confirms the results of Table 6, which 
showed a 56 percent overall rate of litigation cost denials in Nazareth in cases 
won by plaintiffs—a rate far higher than in other districts.  Table 6 also showed a 
different pattern of litigation cost denials in cases won by defendants.  In such 
cases, Beer Sheva judges were the most likely to deny litigation costs.  Regression 
models (models (2) and (4)) also support this result. 
After controlling for other factors, model (1) shows that in cases in which 
plaintiffs prevailed, Nazareth judges were 37.9 percent more likely to deny 
litigation costs than the reference category of Jerusalem judges.  Model (3) shows 
that this difference increases to 49.7 percent in non-Tort cases.  Both differences 
are highly statistically significant.  In model (1), moreover, Nazareth judges not 
only differed significantly from Jerusalem judges but also differed significantly 
from Haifa judges (p<0.001), from Tel Aviv judges (p<0.001), and from Beer 
Sheva judges (p=0.003).  In model (3), without Tort cases, Nazareth judges again 
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significantly differed from Jerusalem judges, Haifa judges (p<0.001), Tel Aviv 
judges (p<0.001), and Beer Sheva judges (p=0.020). 
The district level pattern of litigation cost denials changes dramatically in 
cases won by defendants.  Models (2) and (4) show that the Nazareth–Jerusalem 
difference is much smaller, pointing in inconsistent and statistically insignificant 
directions in these cases.  In model (2), the only significant or near-significant 
differences were between Beer Sheva and Tel Aviv judges (p=0.075) and between 
Beer Sheva and Haifa judges (p=0.048).  In model (4), Beer Sheva judges differed 
significantly from Tel Aviv judges (p=0.047), and differed marginally from Haifa 
judges (p=0.053).  Thus, although Nazareth judges were the most protective of 
losing defendants, Beer Sheva judges seem to be most protective of losing 
plaintiffs. 
As a check on our regression results, we constructed a classification and 
regression tree (CART).  CART analysis helps explore how decisions branch at 
what are believed to be relevant nodes in the analysis (that is, at the explanatory 
variables).101  Each node in a decision tree is split into two groups, and the data 
are then partitioned into those groups to process the data farther down the tree.  
This binary partitioning process is repeated, with child nodes generating their own 
subnodes.  A CART is a useful check on results obtained by logistic regression 
because it is nonparametric and therefore does not depend on assumptions un-
derlying regression models. 
Figure 1 presents a CART for our data.  Although space constraints prevent 
presenting a CART that includes all of our variables, Figure 1 confirms our 
evidence of strong associations between litigation cost102 denials (node 0) and the 
explanatory variables locale, prevailing party, and case category.  The Nazareth 
variable is the highest node in the classification tree, suggesting that influences on 
litigation cost denials are strongly associated with locale.  In the Nazareth 
subgroup of cases, denials are likely further associated with the Property case 
category.  For non-Nazareth cases, the next highest node is the prevailing party 
variable (nodes 3 and 4).  This result supports modeling cases won by plaintiffs 
separately from cases won by defendants.  For the 429 non-Nazareth cases won 
by defendants, the Tort case category is the next node (nodes 7 and 8), with large 
differences in litigation cost denials between its two branches.  This supports 
examining models that exclude Tort cases.  Overall, then, this nonparametric 
  
101. See generally LEO BREIMAN ET AL., CLASSIFICATION AND REGRESSION TREES (1984); 
Jonathan P. Kastellec, The Statistical Analysis of Judicial Decisions and Legal Rules With Classification 
Trees, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 202 (2010). 
102. In Figure 1’s nodes, the term fees is used to represent litigation costs to conserve space. 
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CART analysis confirms the associations detected in the bivariate and regression 
analyses and provides a reasonable visualization of the data. 
 
Figure 1.  Classification and Regression Tree for Litigation Cost Denial 
V. DISCUSSION 
Our results suggest a hierarchy in which Israeli judges are most protective of 
individual litigants and least protective of large corporations.  The greater pro-
tection of individuals is substantially attributable to Tort cases.  The regression 
models are generally consistent with the raw rates of litigation cost denials by 
party status and with the bivariate results presented in Tables 4 to 6. 
In addition to this individual protection theme, the data suggest that Israel’s 
judges operate at least three different de facto litigation cost allocation subsys-
tems, depending on the nature of the case and the status of the parties.  We find 
evidence of subsystems dominated by one-way shifting, by a loser pays rule, and 
by a mixed system of loser pays with discretion to deny litigation costs.  We even 
find a pocket of cases in one district where the American rule prevailed for one 
kind of case. 
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A. One-Way Shifting Dominates in Tort 
In Tort cases, Israel’s district court judges produced results that are about as 
close to a one-way shifting system for litigation costs as they are to a loser pays 
system.  Table 4 shows that 42 percent of successful Tort defendants did not 
recover their litigation costs, whereas 96 percent of successful plaintiffs recovered 
theirs.  This pattern overwhelmingly favors individual plaintiffs; Table 3 shows 
that individual plaintiffs brought 92 percent of tort actions. 
Deeper analysis of litigation cost denial patterns in Tort cases offers insights 
into the possible effects of granting the U.S. corporate tort reform movement’s wish 
for the implementation of a loser pays litigation cost allocation system.  Table 8 shows 
the pattern of litigation cost denials by plaintiff-defendant party status combina-
tions in Tort cases.  Corporations would likely be most concerned about cases in 
which individuals sued them because that is the most frequent plaintiff-defendant 
combination in Tort cases.  In cases won by individual plaintiffs, corporations had 
to pay their own litigation costs plus plaintiffs’ litigation costs 99 percent of the 
time.  In cases won by defendants, on the other hand, prevailing corporations still 
had to pay their own litigation costs 52 percent of the time.  When weighting these 
percentages by the frequency of plaintiff wins (139 cases) and defendant wins (31 
cases), corporate defendants paid their own litigation costs in 90 percent of the 170 
Tort cases in which individual plaintiffs sued corporate defendants.  The individual 
plaintiffs, on the other hand, paid their own litigation costs in only 10 percent of 
cases.  These results are much closer to one-way shifting than to a loser pays system.  
These results are not a reflection of Israeli judges tending to deny all victorious 
Tort defendants their litigation costs.  When corporate defendants prevailed in Tort 
cases against corporate plaintiffs, litigation costs were rarely denied, though that 
plaintiff-defendant combination was infrequent. 
If, therefore, the United States adopted a loser pays rule, gave judges 
discretion to deny litigation costs, and American judges behaved similarly to Israeli 
judges, corporations might not only have to pay their own litigation costs in the 
vast majority of cases but also often have to pay the plaintiffs’ litigation costs.  Un-
der the current American rule, by contrast, they only have to pay their own liti-
gation costs—win or lose.  As Stephen Yeazell intimated in commenting on the 
effects of discovery reform, be careful what you wish for.103  Florida’s aborted ex-
  
103. See Stephen C. Yeazell, Getting What We Asked for, Getting What We Paid for, and Not Liking What We 
Got: The Vanishing Civil Trial, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 943, 945 (2004) (“Having got what we 
asked for and what we paid for, we are now soberly assessing the results.”). 
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periment with a loser pays rule in medical malpractice cases104 reinforces the impli-
cations of the Israeli experience. 
 
TABLE 8.  Rate of Litigation Cost Denials in Tort Cases by Plaintiff-Defendant 
Party Status Combination and Prevailing Party 
 Defendant won Plaintiff won Total 
Individual v. 
Individual (n=103) 0.43 0.07 0.16 
Individual v. 
Corporation (n=170) 0.52 0.01 0.11 
Individual v. 
Government (n=55) 0.50 0.05 0.35 
Corporation v. 
Individual (n=8) 0.00 0.25 0.13 
Corporation v. 
Corporation (n=18) 0.08 0.00 0.06 
Corporation v. 
Government (n=5) 0.33 0.00 0.20 
Total (n=359) 0.42 0.04 0.16 
Source: Dinim database of Israeli civil district court cases that were adjudicated on the merits and 
terminated in 2005–06. 
 
A similar pattern emerges from the much smaller class of Expropriation 
cases, most of which involve individuals suing the government.  In the eight cases 
won by individual plaintiffs against the government, litigation costs were never de-
nied.  In the five cases won by the government against individual plaintiffs, liti-
gation costs were denied in two cases.  These results again suggest protection for 
individuals. 
B. Loser Pays Dominates for Public Corporations 
Evidence of a loser pays norm was most prominent in cases involving public 
corporations.  Within the corporate party category, we coded for whether a cor-
porate plaintiff or defendant was a public corporation.  We expect such corpo-
rations to have more assets, on average, than other parties, which may influence 
judges’ litigation cost rulings.  One-hundred-thirty cases, or 11.4 percent of the 
sample, involved public corporate defendants, and forty-four cases, or 3.9 percent 
  
104. See supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text. 
1490 60 UCLA L. REV. 1452 (2013) 
 
 
of the sample, involved public corporate plaintiffs.  Of the 130 cases with public 
corporate defendants, plaintiffs prevailed in seventy-six cases and had their liti-
gation costs denied in 7.9 percent of them.  Similarly, judges denied litigation costs 
in only one of the fourteen cases (7.1 percent) that involved public corporate 
plaintiffs that lost to a prevailing defendant.  The near-uniform treatment of 
public corporations precludes efforts to identify factors (such as case category or dis-
trict) that may influence the treatment of such corporations.  Little variation exists 
in the outcome of interest, litigation cost denials, which could be explained using 
other factors present in the cases.  Despite our resulting inability to include public 
corporate status as an explanatory variable in our regression models, our models 
reflect some of the treatment of these corporations.  This is because variables 
representing corporate status, without further distinguishing between public and 
private status, remained in the models and public corporations represent a 
significant number of the parties characterized as corporations. 
Further examination of public corporation cases shows how close the Israeli 
litigation cost allocation system operated as a nearly uniform loser pays system as 
applied when such corporations lost.  Of the 130 cases in which public corpo-
rations were defendants, 98 percent had only two plaintiff-defendant patterns: Ei-
ther the public corporation sued another corporation or an individual sued the 
public corporation.  Judges denied litigation costs in only 6.5 percent of cases (4 of 
62) in which an individual plaintiff succeeded against a public corporation.  
Similarly, judges awarded litigation costs to successful corporate plaintiffs in 83 
percent of cases (10 of 12) in which they prevailed against a public corporation 
defendant.  By contrast, judges denied litigation costs in one-quarter of the cases 
(9 of 36) in which a public corporation prevailed against an individual plaintiff.  
Judges also denied litigation costs in 24 percent of the cases (4 of 17) in which a 
public corporation defendant prevailed against a corporate plaintiff.  Of the forty-
three cases for which we have data on public corporations as plaintiffs, judges de-
nied litigation costs in 7 percent of the cases (1 of 14) in which the public 
corporation lost and in 10 percent of the cases (3 of 29) in which the public corpo-
ration plaintiff prevailed. 
C. Mixed System 
In cases not involving Tort, Expropriation, or public corporations, Israel oper-
ates a system in which litigation costs are awarded approximately equally in cases 
won by plaintiffs and defendants.  Of the remaining 641 cases, 349 were won by 
plaintiffs with litigation costs being denied in 25.8 percent of them.  In the 292 
cases won by defendants, litigation costs were denied in 22.3 percent of the cases.  
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Thus, a soft loser pays rule dominated but with substantial rates of departure for 
both plaintiffs and defendants. 
D. District Effects 
The data also show that the treatment of litigation costs varied depending 
on the district that heard the case.  This might be in part because the case category 
mix varied by district.  As Table 1 showed, Property cases dominated Nazareth’s 
docket.  They comprised more than 50 percent of Nazareth’s cases, while they 
did not account for more than half of that share in any other district.  Nazareth’s 
high overall litigation cost denial rate derived from its 72.7 percent denial rate in 
Property cases won by plaintiffs, a rate nearly triple that of any other district.  
These cases were mostly litigated between individual plaintiffs and individual 
defendants.  In Nazareth Property cases, Israeli judges come closest to the 
American rule of each party bearing its own costs. 
E. Party Status Hierarchy 
Against the background of the importance of case categories and other 
factors such as court locale, a party status hierarchy emerges.  Israeli judges were 
least protective of public corporations, which almost always had to pay litigation 
costs both as losing defendants and as losing plaintiffs.  They were most 
protective of individual litigants, who often did not have to pay their adversaries’ 
litigation costs as losing plaintiffs, and were rarely denied their litigation costs as 
winning plaintiffs in the large category of Tort cases. 
Evidence of protection of individual litigants also exists in the two other 
large case categories of Contract and Property.  In results not reported in the 
tables above, we examined the pattern of litigation cost denials by case category 
and plaintiff-defendant combination.  Courts once again protected individuals, as 
litigation costs were denied in 37.1 percent of Contract cases lost by individual 
plaintiffs against individual defendants, in 20 percent of Contract cases lost by 
individual plaintiffs against corporate defendants, and in 50 percent of Contract 
cases lost by individual plaintiffs against government defendants.  Litigation cost 
denial patterns in Property cases do not provide as much useful information 
about party status because such cases overwhelmingly involved individual 
litigants.  Individuals were plaintiffs in 84.1 percent of all Property cases and 
defendants in an additional 4.5 percent of cases.  Litigation cost denials were 
common in such cases, particularly in cases won by individual plaintiffs against 
individual defendants, in which litigation costs were denied 43.8 percent of the 
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time.  This pattern is sensitive to inclusion of cases from Nazareth, but this is in 
part because Property cases were so prevalent in that district. 
CONCLUSION 
Israeli judges usually require losing parties to pay their adversaries’ litigation 
costs.  The loser pays rule is most strictly applied to public corporations, which are 
generally required to pay both parties’ litigation costs as losing plaintiffs and 
losing defendants.  When plaintiffs prevail on their claims in whole rather than in 
part, they are much less likely to have their litigation costs denied, suggesting that 
a party’s degree of success influences judicial decisions to award litigation costs.  
Substantial pockets of departure from the loser pays norm exist, however.  The 
norm is asymmetrically applied in Tort cases, in which prevailing plaintiffs 
almost always receive litigation costs while prevailing defendants receive them 
only little more than half the time.  It is also the exception, rather than the rule, in 
Property cases in Nazareth. 
The Israeli litigation cost award pattern is thus consistent with the qual-
itative descriptions of loser pays systems that led Reimann to reject the American 
rule–British rule dichotomy.  The loser pays jurisdictions described by Reimann 
were so riddled with exceptions and limitations on amounts awarded as to 
suggest that no large group of jurisdictions regularly awards winners litigation 
costs more than Israeli judges do—regardless of what litigation cost rule these 
jurisdictions outwardly claim to apply.  Further confirmation of Israel’s consisten-
cy with less judge-centered systems requires more systematic information from 
loser pays jurisdictions.  The variety of litigation cost subsystems that Israeli judg-
es seem to implement is also an interesting judicial complement to the variety of 
litigation cost clauses that large corporations choose when they contract with one 
another outside of court.105  The variety of litigation cost allocation methods that 
exists in both judge-centered systems and in a private contractual setting suggests 
that theorizing about optimal litigation cost rules should consider the rich variety 
actual practice reveals. 
This Article mainly described previously unstudied patterns of litigation cost 
denials.  Whatever the implications of our findings for the global debate about the 
optimal litigation cost allocation system, our results should be of great interest for 
practitioners.  Israeli lawyers and clients now have systematic evidence about liti-
gation cost denials in civil cases litigated to conclusion.  This evidence should 
  
105. See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 5, at 352 tbl.2 (showing no attorney’s fee rule dominates in U.S. 
public corporation contracts). 
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inform their decisions about whether to accept cases, whether to file suit, and 
about what kind of postfiling litigation behavior to engage in.  For example, 
lawyers in Nazareth Property cases may wish to inform their plaintiff clients about 
the high probability of not recovering litigation costs even if they prevail.  
Lawyers in Tort cases throughout Israel may wish to inform their clients about 
the asymmetric treatment of litigation cost denials in such cases.  Our descriptive 
data also support at least one normative observation.  It has been argued that a fair 
and efficient litigation cost system requires asymmetry with express consideration 
given to the relative wealth of the litigants.106  When Israeli judges departed from 
the default loser pays treatment, they usually did so in a way that is consistent 
with this aspiration. 
 
  
106. See Rosen-Zvi, supra note 1, at 717 (proposing a “progressive one-way fee-shifting rule as a means of 
equalizing justice in civil litigation and assisting people of modest means in financing litigation 
against wealthy adversaries”). 
